Privatization in Bolivia: The Impact on Firm Performance by Mauricio Garrón B. et al.
       








Inter-American Development Bank 
Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo 
Latin American Research Network 
Red de Centros de Investigación 




Privatization in Bolivia:  





Mauricio Garrón B. 













 Cataloging-in-Publication data provided by the  
Inter-American Development Bank  
Felipe Herrera Library 
 
 
Garrón B., Mauricio. 
 
Privatization in Bolivia : the impact on firm performance / by Mauricio Garrón B., 
Carlos Gustavo Machicado, Katherina Capra. 
 
p. cm.   (Research Network Working papers ; R-461) 
Includes bibliographical references. 
 
1. Privatization--Bolivia.    2. Manufacturing industries--Bolivia.    I. Machicado, Carlos 
Gustavo   II. Capra, Katherina.    III. Inter-American Development Bank. Research  Dept.   
IV. Latin American Research Network.   V. Series.   
 
 











Inter-American Development Bank 
1300 New York Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20577 
 
The views and interpretations in this document are those of the authors and should not be 
attributed to the Inter-American Development Bank, or to any individual acting on its 
behalf. 
 
This paper is part of the Latin American Research Network project “Costs and Benefits of 
Privatization in Latin America.” The terms of reference for the project can be found on the 
internet at:  http://www.iadb.org/res/laresnetwork/studies/st70tor.pdf 
 
The Research Department (RES) produces a quarterly newsletter, IDEA (Ideas for 
Development in the Americas), as well as working papers and books on diverse economic 
issues. To obtain a complete list of RES publications, and read or download them please 




This report studies the change in performance of Bolivian State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) that have been transferred to the private sector. The 
paper focuses particularly on how ownership affects management by 
measuring the characteristics of management and relating them to both 
ownership structure and performance. It argues that the characteristics of 
private management that follow privatization are a key factor in 
determining the effects of privatization on performance. To determine the 
impact of privatization on the performance of the 31 firms studied, the 
authors performed two ratio analyses, one with unadjusted and the other 
with adjusted ratios. For this purpose, they undertook two regression 
analyses, one with panel data and the other with a cross section analysis. 
Two methods were used to conduct privatization of Bolivian SOEs, and 
the process took place in three stages. The methods were traditional, or 
standard, privatization and capitalization. Traditional privatization 
consisted of the complete transfer (assets and shares) to the private sector 
of companies operating in competitive markets. Capitalization involved 
attracting private firms to invest in and manage key SOEs. SOEs were not 
sold outright. Instead, private investors gained managerial control but no 
more than 50 percent of equity. 
 
Keywords: Privatization, Capitalization, Firm Performance, Corporate Governance 
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  3  41. Introduction 
 
Ever since Britain embarked on a major privatization effort in 1979, the transfer of state-
run companies to private hands has been fashionable throughout the world. Privatization, or 
the transfer of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) to the private sector, was commonly 
associated with a new vision of the State’s economic role that gained currency in the 1990s. 
This new view favored an increased role in the economy for markets and the private sector, 
and a corresponding reduction of the State’s involvement in the production of goods and 
services. Privatization came into vogue just as Latin American nations began to recognize 
that the State’s involvement in production activities failed to deliver the promised results. 
The acceptance of privatization meant the abandonment of the import substitution paradigm 
that had been in place in the region for decades.  
Bolivia, like many other Latin American countries, adopted privatization and has 
begun the process of transferring SOEs to the private sector. While the privatization process 
in Bolivia is small by international standards, both in terms of number and size of firms, the 
Bolivian privatization process has some particular characteristics that render its analysis of 
interest. 
Bolivian privatization is unique for its use of two different techniques to transfer 
SOEs to the private sector: standard privatization (the outright sale of the enterprises) and 
capitalization. Capitalization differs from traditional privatization in that ownership is not 
transferred entirely to the strategic private investor. While the private investor owns a 
controlling share of the enterprise, the Bolivian population, represented by an institutional 
investor, owns a significant part of the shares. 
Even though privatization processes have been adopted in most Latin American 
countries and in many of the former communist countries, relatively little analysis of the 
impact of privatization has been conducted. Most of the literature on privatization tends to 
be descriptive or to concentrate on case studies. Nevertheless, in recent years, the body of 
literature assessing the impact of privatization has grown as different studies, increasingly 
more sophisticated and ambitious, have been undertaken. The general lessons emerging 
from this new body of literature suggest that this type of analysis is worth pursuing, albeit 
with some qualifications.  
  5The existing literature on Bolivian privatization is relatively scarce and tends to be 
descriptive. The capitalization process has sparked a significant number of articles both 
inside and outside Bolivia. Most, however, only describe the process, and a few clearly 
seek to further political positions rather than understand the consequences of transfers. 
Thus, much remains to be done in order to understand privatization’s impact on Bolivia. 
Following some recent studies on privatization, in particular La Porta and Lopez-de-
Silanes (1999), this study attempts to establish whether former SOEs have improved their 
performance as a result of changed ownership structure. Ownership can be seen influencing 
performance inasmuch as different ownership structures may be associated with: i) 
different objectives, ii) different constraints, and iii) different management characteristics. 
Thus, the underlying theme of this report is the relationship between ownership structure 
(public or private) and performance. 
Many arguments can be put forth to explain, from a theoretical perspective, why 
privatizing an enterprise could lead to improved performance. One would expect, and the 
literature assumes, that private ownership leads to: i) a more precise definition of objectives 
(i.e., adopting objectives more closely associated with firm performance instead of the 
multiple, disparate objectives commonly found among public enterprises), ii) the relaxation 
of certain constraints (such as those that limit access to financing) and iii) certain 
management characteristics. Given that the first two have an impact on management, the 
style of private management becomes a key factor in determining the effects of 
privatization on performance. 
In general, it is implicitly assumed that private firms have very similar objectives, 
constraints and management characteristics. While this assumption holds up in the cases of 
midsize or large publicly-held and traded corporations, it might not necessarily apply to the 
case of smaller private firms with different ownership structures. In particular, small 
family-owned firms may not face conditions that require them to operate with the discipline 
and controls required of publicly-traded firms. 
Furthermore, such firms may have a wider range of objectives (i.e., not focus 
exclusively on maximizing shareholder value) and may in some respects be more severely 
constrained (e.g., find access to financing more difficult) than publicly-traded private firms. 
 
  6Whether those differences are strong enough to translate into differences in 
management, and, in turn, into differences in performance must be determined empirically. 
However, given the size and nature of many of the firms considered in this study, special 
attention is given to the manner in which ownership affects management. In order to do 
this, the authors attempted to measure the characteristics of management by relating them 
to both ownership structure and performance. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a review of 
the conceptual framework upon which privatization processes have been based, as well as 
the different arguments for and against privatization. It also presents some of the empirical 
work undertaken to evaluate privatization processes and their applicability to the Bolivian 
case. 
Section 3 describes the specific privatization processes carried out in Bolivia. The 
two methods took place over three “waves” coinciding with three different governmental 
periods. It also reviews the existing studies on privatization in Bolivia and describes the 
effort made to collect information for the present study, with an emphasis on the limitations 
and quality of available information. 
Section 4 discusses the universe of firms considered in the study as well as the 
criteria employed to determine the sample. Section 5 describes the information utilized in 
the empirical analysis and presents the results obtained in the ratio analyses. 
Section 6 presents the results obtained in the analysis of panel data as well as a 
cross-section analysis. Finally, the last section presents a summary of the main results. 
 
2. Privatization: The Conceptual Framework 
 
Privatization is generally defined as the transfer of assets and/or service functions from 
public to private hands. Such a broad definition allows for a wide range of transfers to fall 
under the term privatization. For the purposes of this study, the authors narrow the 
definition of privatization to any sale of SOEs in which private buyers obtain a controlling 
interest and assume management of the firm. 
  The transfer of SOEs, whereby the State trades its ownership claim for an explicit 
cash payment, can take different forms depending on the method of sale and the share of 
claims sold. In this study, two forms are considered to reflect the two methods adopted for 
  7the Bolivian privatization process. The first one is the direct sale o f  a n  S O E  t o  a n  
individual, a group of investors, or an existing corporation. The second one, somewhat 
analogous to a share issue privatization, has been called capitalization and is a transfer of 
part of the State’s stake in an SOE to investors in exchange for their commitment to 




2.1 Objectives Pursued Under Privatization 
 
There are many reasons for embarking on the privatization process. A number of different 
objectives, displayed in Table 1, are usually mentioned in the privatization literature. The 
objectives range from economic (with either a micro or macroeconomic emphasis) to 
political. These objectives can also be viewed from the perspective of firms and consumers. 
 
Table 1: Sample of Most Common Privatization Objectives 
 
Economic 
Achieve higher productivity and efficiency 
Strengthen the role of the private sector in the economy 
Improve the public sector’s financial health 
Provide autonomy to satisfy financing requirements 
 
Political 
Remove the enterprise from political interference 
Free resources for allocation to other priority areas 
Make it possible for employees to participate as shareholders 
 
Firm Oriented 
Improve performance (associated with efficiency argument) 
 
Consumer Oriented 
Improve services and/or goods (lower prices and better quality) 
 
 
Given the variety of objectives, it seems appropriate to follow Sheshinski and López’s 
(1999) argument that a privatization program should be evaluated by whether or not the 
original objectives of the privatization were achieved. It is readily apparent, however, that 
many of these objectives are interrelated. 
                                                 
1 For the purpose of this study, both cases are considered privatization. The authors use the term “transfer of 
SOEs” when they want to emphasize the difference between them. 
 
  8In the case of Bolivia’s privatization process, more than one of the listed objectives 
applies. Nevertheless, as a first attempt at evaluating the Bolivian privatization program, 
and in concordance with the IDB project, it is appropriate for this paper to follow the 
literature (Nellis, 1991; Moore, 1990; Wiltshire, 1987; Carney, 1993 and others) that 
assumes the main objective behind the privatization effort was increased efficiency of the 
privatized firm’s use of resources. In terms of individual privatized firms, this means 
improved performance. 
 
2.2 The Arguments For and Against Privatization 
 
In recent years, developments in the fields of contract theory and property theory (Shleifer,  
1998) have brought researchers’ attention to the debate regarding public versus private 
provision of goods and services. 
According to contract theory, the government could, in principle, draw up a contract 
with requirements to ensure that the contractor delivers the desired results.
2 According to 
this view, whether the service is provided by a public or private entity is irrelevant since 
compliance with the contract guarantees that the government’s objectives will be met; 
however, the question of whether it is possible to draw up a “perfect contract” remains 
unanswered.
3 
On the other hand, through its argument that contracts are imperfect or incomplete, 
property theory emphasizes asset ownership as the foundation for control of the 
management of the business. Furthermore, the control that owners possess, manifested 
through the incentive structure they have defined, influences managers and affects their 
performance.
4 
Two opposing views, the “Social View” and the “Agency View,” have recently 
gained prominence. The existence of market failures, which under imperfect competition 
enables the exercise of monopoly power, gives rise to the need for public intervention. The 
focus on market failures and the concurrent argument that public ownership allows for 
consideration of marginal social costs, has been called the “Social View.” 
                                                 
2 A contract that includes all known and unknown eventualities is called a “perfect contract.” 
3 A contract that does not include all eventualities is called an “imperfect or incomplete contract.” 
  9On the other hand, a key argument in favor of privatization is the assumption that 
state-owned companies pursue too many objectives (political, social and economic), which 
impedes the application of any of the previous theories. As a result, the so-called “Agency 
View” incorporates the problems of incentives and contracts agreed upon between firms as 
elements relevant to improved efficiency on the microeconomic level (Sheshinski and 
López-Calva, 1999). 
  Within the “Agency View,” there are two viewpoints that attempt to explain why 
public firms generate inadequate incentives, which result in poorer performance than 
private firms. These viewpoints are called the business management perspective and the 
political perspective.
5 
The business management perspective argues that monitoring managers is less 
effective in public firms, thus public ownership results in fewer incentives for improved 
performance as compared to private firms. The political perspective, meanwhile, asserts 
that the lower efficiency of public enterprises can be blamed on the presence of multiple 
objectives and constraints that incorporate non-economic considerations, such as 
politically-influenced budgets. Thus, privatization can promote efficiency by focusing the 
enterprise’s objectives (i.e., reducing the number and ambiguity of the objectives set forth 
for a public enterprise) and by removing the distortions caused by the constraints facing the 
enterprise (Commander and Killick, 1988). 
 
2.3 Empirical Studies on Privatization 
 
To date, empirical analysis of privatization has been conducted primarily from a 
microeconomic perspective. Individual characteristics of firms before and after 
privatization are compared; analysis usually focuses on the use of ratios to measure firm 
performance. 
Obtaining reliable financial balances, however, has proven to be the principal 
problem researchers face when performing such an analysis. This is especially true in 
                                                                                                                                                     
4 Some extensions to these two initial arguments analyze the relationship between property, efficiency and 
contracts more deeply. These include: Agency Theory, Public Choice Theory, Property Rights Theory and 
Transactions Costs Analysis (Commander and Killick, 1988, and Hodge, 1999, among others). 
5 For the management perspective, see Vickers and Yarrow (1988). For the political perspective, see Shapiro 
and Willing (1990), Shleifer and Vishny (1994), and others. 
 
  10developing countries where the public management of firms was not sufficiently 
documented to provide exact information regarding their status. As a result, the literature 
available on this topic is scarce. 
In an attempt to answer the question of whether privatization has improved firm 
performance, the majority of the studies in this area have adopted the agency view. The 
existing empirical literature can be classified into three broad groups: 
•  Case Studies (Performed by sector and specific firms): This group 
includes studies such as Ramamurti (1997), D’Souza (1998), 
Eckel, Eckel and Singal (1997) and Newberry and Pollitt (1997). 
The first two studies found that privatization in specific sectors 
(trains and telecommunications, respectively) increased 
productivity and reduced the workforce. In addition, Eckel, Eckel 
and Singal (1997) shows that after the privatization of a state 
enterprise (in this case British Airways), sector prices fell. Finally, 
Newberry and Pollitt found that the people who benefit from 
privatization are the producers and shareholders, while consumers 
and the government do not benefit. 
•  Inter-Country Studies (Based upon large samples of firms in 
different sectors and for a specific country):  This group 
encompasses studies by Martín and Parker (1995), Barberis, 
Boycko, Shleifer, and Tsukanova (1996), Claessens, Djankov, and 
Pohl (1997) and La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1997), among 
others. These studies found that privatized firms improved their 
performance, that change in management (new owners and 
administrators) contributed to higher value of the firms, and that 
the improvement in the profitability of the businesses was largely 
explained by improvements in productivity rather than by higher 
sale prices or reductions in the labor force. 
•  Cross-Section Studies (analysis of firms across countries): Some of 
the studies applying this methodology are Galal, Jones, Tandon, 
and Vogelsang (1992), Megginson, Nash, and Van Randenborgh 
  11(1994), Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapaczynski (1998), and 
Boubakri and Cosset (1998). In general, these studies find 
improved performance in the privatized companies. 
However, Pohl, Claessens and Djankov (1997), working with a sample of 6,300 
firms, show that the positive effects of privatization on corporate performance are not 
uniform among different types of firms and performance measures. These authors conclude 
that one cannot generalize that privatization brings about an improvement in firms’ 
performance.  
  To these studies, other recent research placing more emphasis on the nature of firm 
management must be added. This recent research attempts to gauge the extent to which the 
transfer of ownership to the private sector is the key element in improved firm 
performance. These studies analyze the problem using agency models, where the ownership 
structure is represented through different principal-agent arrangements. 
They distinguish two types of property: “Disperse Ownership,” where the owner-
administrator relationship is the central problem of corporate governance, and 
“Concentrated Ownership,” where the central problem is the majority shareholder-minority 
investor relationship. 
These studies follow the work of Schleifer and Vishny (1997), who define the 
problem of corporate governance as one of external financing. A functional system of 
corporate governance is one where concentrated ownership exists and promotes profit- 
maximizing behavior, and where a legal framework is in place to protect suppliers of 
external financing. In this vein, La Porta et al. (1998) analyzed the differences in the legal 
framework and found that the historical beginnings of the legal system determined the level 
of protection provided to investors. Greater legal protection implied a lower need for 
property concentration, which in turn increased access to external financing and reduced 
capital costs. Mayer (1998) analyzed two central elements of the agency vision of corporate 
governance: investment patterns in economies with advanced markets and the disciplinary 
mechanisms applied to managers in companies with poor performance. The author 
concluded that property and control did not affect financing sources or disciplinary 
methods, but they did influence other activities within the firm. 
 
 
  122.4 The Applicability of Recent Studies to Bolivia 
 
Recent studies on privatization attempt to establish whether former SOEs have improved 
their performance as a result of ownership change. Thus, the underlying theme in the 
empirical literature on privatization and its effects is the relationship between ownership 
(public vs. private) and performance. When looking at this relationship, it is necessary to 
pay attention to two issues: the choice of performance measures, and the means through 
which ownership affects performance. 
  Most of the growing literature on privatization adopts measures such as those 
utilized by La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1997). In doing so, they adopt two implicit 
assumptions with implications that, for purposes of the privatization of Bolivian 
enterprises, deserve to be considered. 
First, the measures implicitly assume that the objective of the privatizations studied, 
and hence the yardstick by which they should be evaluated, is improved firm performance. 
The importance of this assumption arises from the possibility that public and private firms 
will have different objectives. Private firms tend to focus more on efficiency and 
performance, while public enterprises may have other, more diffuse objectives. It is no 
surprise, then, that private firms fare better under a measure that emphasizes performance. 
  The second assumption is that management characteristics are similar for all private 
firms (vis-à-vis public ones) regardless of their ownership structure. The importance of this 
second assumption should be explained clearly. Since performance depends on 
management characteristics (which in turn reflect objectives and constraints), ownership 
influences performance inasmuch as different ownership structures may be associated with 
different management characteristics. When considering privately-owned firms, one cannot 
assume similar ownership structure since in reality, a wide variety of ownership structures 
can be observed. The fact that most empirical studies have focused on firms whose stock 
trades publicly means that the ownership structure of the private firms considered in those 
studies is similar. Thus, there is no need to look explicitly at management characteristics. If, 
however, the ownership structures of private firms happen to be different, as in the group of 
firms analyzed in this paper, closer attention must be paid to the relationship between 
ownership structure and management characteristics. In particular, attention must be 
focused on whether different types of ownership structures—corporations, widely held 
  13enterprises, or smaller, family-owned businesses—lead to similar or different management 
characteristics. 
 
3. The Bolivian Experience with Privatization 
 
3.1 The Privatization Efforts 
 
Prior to 1992, the Bolivian government sought increased private involvement in certain 
traditionally public sectors by undertaking shared risk contracts. These contracts stipulated 
that the State would transfer the SOE’s existing assets to a private administration that 
would oversee the necessary investments for the development of the business. Within this 
framework, the State would receive a flat fee and the private firm would have a claim to 
any residual profits. The first shared-risk contracts were signed in the 1980s in the sectors 
of mining and hydrocarbons, two sectors in which this practice continues to the present day. 
Subsequently, in the 1990s the transfer of SOEs to the private sector in Bolivia took 
place through two schemes and in three “waves.” The two scehmes were traditional, or 
standard, privatization and capitalization. The three waves correspond to three different 
governments
6 and refer to periods in which renewed impetus was given to the privatization 
effort. The first wave started in 1992 with the enactment of the Privatization Law.
7 The 
second wave, which introduced “Capitalization,” began in 1995. Finally, the third wave, 
which reinstated standard privatization of SOEs, started in 1998. The firms privatized in 
this third wave were not included in the study since not enough time has passed for the 




With the April 1992 enactment of the Privatization Law, Bolivia started to privatize its 
public enterprises. This process was characterized by the complete transfer (assets and 
shares) of companies that operated in competitive markets and were considered “small” 
                                                 
6 The governments of Jaime Paz Zamora (1989-1993), Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (1993-1997), and Hugo 
Banzer Suárez (1997-2001). 
7 Privatization Law Nº 1330, April 24, 1992. 
 
  14businesses. These SOEs participated in a wide range of activities, including flour 
collection, hotels, bus terminals, milk processing, and others.
8 
The objectives of these privatizations were to: i) reduce the public sector deficit, ii) 
transfer productive activities to the private sector, and iii) direct the proceeds of the 
privatization to social investment through programs in health, education, and basic 
infrastructure. 
Under this wave, 34 SOEs considered non-performing and engaged in activities that 
could be assumed by the private sector were privatized. The majority of these enterprises 
were not making a profit and, in most cases, did not fully utilize their installed capacity. 
In addition, most SOEs employed an excess of personnel and received government 
subsidies (Ministry of Capitalization, 1994). The table below lists the 34 SOEs transferred 
to the private sector up to 1993. 
 
Table 2: First Wave of Privatization (Traditional Method) 
SOEs Sales  Value 
($US) 
1.  Fondo Ganadero del Beni y Pando      n.a 
2.  Fábrica de Objetos de Peltre                n.a 
3.  Empresa Forestal Pecuaria Tariquia     n.a 
4.  Planta Industrializadora de Quinua       n.a 
5.  Planta de Alimentos Balanceados Portachuelo     140.000 
6.  Empresa Nacional de La Castaña         n.a 
7.  Industrias Metálicas (Inmetal)              n.a 
8.  Línea Aérea Imperial                            n.a 
9.  Pait - Pl Procesadora de Caranavi         n.a 
10.  Cadenas Andinas Sam                         n.a 
11.  Criadero de Truchas Piuisilla              n.a 
12.  Pollos Bb                                             n.a 
13.  Taller de Cerámica Artesanal Chuquisaca   n.a 
14.  Fábrica Nal. de Fósforos                      n.a 
15.  Hotel La Paz (Ex-Sheraton)                 n.a 
16.  Hotel Crillon                                        n.a 
17.  Fábrica de Cerámica Roja de Trinidad   13.000 
    
                                                 
8 This same method was used for larger SOEs in the third wave. 
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SOEs Sales  Value 
($US) 
18.  Fábrica de Cerámica Roja de Cobija  110.000 
19.  Hotel Prefectural Liriuni  n.a 
20.  Centro de Acopio Yamparaez  24.200 
21.  Centro de Acopio Redención Pampa  18.000 
22.  Centro de Acopio Tomina  18.200 
23.  Hacienda Ganadera Santa Martha  n.a 
24.  Hotel Prefectural de Caranavi  43.932 
25.  Cabaña Lechera Todos Santos Paz  938.550 
26.  Hotel Prefectural de Pando  98.900 
27.  Centro de Acopio Totora  15.000 
28.  Centro de Acopio Lourdes  1.400 
29.  Centro de Acopio Betanzos  8.477 
30.  Fabrica de Aceites Comestibles 
Villamontes 
n.a 
31.  Fábrica Boliviana de Cerámica  1,287.000 
32.  Fábrica de Cerámica Roja de Oruro  173.000 
33.  Hotel Prefectural de Tarija  n.a 
34.  Ingenio Azucarero Guabira  n.a 
        Source: Unidad de Reordenamiento.
9  
 
The government contracted consultancy firms and investment banks to conduct the 
necessary studies for the sales of relatively larger firms, such as valuation and sale-strategy 
recommendations. Independent consultants were employed to undertake the evaluation 
studies of the smaller businesses. 
On the whole, enterprises transferred to the private sector under traditional 
privatization were sold through public auctions and public bidding processes. The first to be 
privatized were the smaller businesses (as measured by the number of employees and 
assets). The majority of these businesses were sold to only one buyer per firm, and by 
international standards, the size of the privatized firms was small. The base sale prices in 
the auction ranged from US$1,389 (a flour collection business) to US$10 million (a sugar 
factory).  
The businesses were sold “as is,” with the State paying the social benefits of the 
workers in advance. In some cases, the workers were offered the option of purchasing 





                                                 
9 The privatization books are incomplete, so the sales value of many SOEs is marked not available (n.a). 
  16Second Wave 
 
In the second wave, a second method of privatization was adopted. While some 
privatizations still consisted of the full transfer of ownership of assets, and hence 
management control of SOEs, the Bolivian government adopted a second method, called 
capitalization. Capitalization had particular features that are described in some detail later. 
Under the classic privatization model, 36 enterprises were transferred as follows: 
 
Table 3: Privatized Enterprises (Second Wave) 
SOEs Sale  Value  ($US) 
35.  Empresa Transportadora de Electricidad (TDE)    39,900.000 
36.  Empresa de Generación Eléctrica Luz y  
Fuerza de Cochabamba (ELFEC)      
50,000.000 
37.  Hilandería Santa Cruz Sam       4,005.686 
38.  Planta Laminadora de Goma Sam     n.a. 
39.  Bien  Inmueble         n.a. 
40.  Planta de Hilandería Viacha (Phv)     n.a. 
41.  Hotel Balneario Asahi         102.000 
42.  Hotel Prefectural Caranavi      43.932 
43.  Hotel Prefectural de Copacabana     310.000 
44.  Hotel Prefectural de Coroico       105.000 
45.  Hotel Prefectural de Sorata       213.000 
46.  Hotel Prefectural Viscachani       135.000 
47.  Hotel Prefectural de Urmiri       238.000 
48.  Hotel Prefectural de Chulumani     105.000 
49.  Hotel Terminal de Oruro       370.000 
50.  Terminal de Buses Oruro       n.a. 
51.  Terminal de Buses Sucre       n.a. 
52.  Terminal de Buses Cochabamba     n.a. 
53.  Producción de Alimentos de Maiz Mairana  n.a. 
54.  Planta de Alimentos Balanceados de Chuquisaca  n.a. 
55.  Planta de Alimentos Balanceados Tarija  n.a. 
56.  Planta Industrializadora de Leche – Scz  n.a. 
57.  Planta Industrializadora de Leche Pil – La Paz  n.a. 
58.  Planta Industrializadora de Leche Pil – Cbba  n.a. 
59.  Planta Industrializadora de Leche Pil – Tarija  n.a. 
60.  Planta Industrializadora de Leche Pil – Sucre  n.a. 
61.  Ingenio Azucarero Guabira  n.a. 
62.  Fabrica de Aceites Comestibles Villamontes  n.a. 
63.  Planta Elaboradora de Quesos San Javier  n.a. 
64.  Planta de Alimentos Balanceados Tarija  n.a. 
65.  Producción de Harinas Compuestas – Tarhui  11.000 
66.  Cabaña de Porcinos "El Zapallar”  n.a. 
67. Hilandería  Pulacayo  n.a. 
68.  Multipropósito Gran Chaco  n.a. 
69.  Fábrica Boliviana de Cerámica  1,287.000 
70.  Fábrica de Cerámica Roja de Oruro  173.000 
                            Source: Unidad de Reordenamiento.
10  
                                                 
10 Again, the privatization books are incomplete and the information was not stored completely. Missing sale 
values are marked as not available (n.a). 
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“Capitalization,” meanwhile, aimed to attract private firms to invest and run key SOEs. The 
Capitalization Law was enacted in March 21, 1994 to enable the new technique. 
Capitalization sought the following objectives: i) attract private investment on a 
large scale, ii) accelerate job creation, iii) transfer managerial control to the private sector in 
order to incorporate technological advances and management capacity, and iv) create a 
long-term saving mechanism to directly redistribute privatization revenue among the 
population, rather than using public programs for this end. 
There were several ways in which capitalization differed from the previous 
privatization of SOEs. First, the private investor acquired only 50 percent, rather than 100 
percent, of equity in the SOE, but were granted complete managerial control. Second, in 
contrast to a traditional privatization, no sale was involved; thus, the National Treasury did 
not receive any proceeds from the transfer. 
Capitalization required an injection of capital into the enterprises under 
consideration. This method allowed private investors to obtain 50 percent ownership of an 
enterprise by committing to invest an amount equal to the market value of the existing 
enterprise. Thus, through this process the equity of the enterprise doubled, the private 
investor held 50 percent of the equity in the capitalized enterprise, and the State held the 
other 50 percent. The State’s percentage, which reflected the ownership of the pre-
capitalized enterprise, was transferred as specified by the Capitalization Law in the form of 
non-transferable shares to newly established Private Pensions Funds. 
The capitalization contracts specified the conditions under which the amounts 
committed by the private investor were to be invested. To make the enterprises more 
attractive, the SOEs’ commercial debts were transferred to the National Treasury (TGN). 
When applied to the largest, most strategic SOEs, this method of transfer resulted 
occasionally in the break-up of state monopolies. The State hydrocarbon enterprise, 
Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos, which had its upstream units capitalized, was 
just such a case. Similarly, the generating units of ENDE, the national electric company, 
were capitalized individually, as were two units of railroad enterprise Empresa Nacional de 
Ferrocarriles (ENFE). 
  18On the other hand, there were also state monopolies that were capitalized without 
breaking up. Such were the cases of the telecommunications enterprise, Empresa Nacional 
de Telecomunicaciones (ENTEL), and the national airline, Lloyd Aéreo Boliviano (LAB).  
As a result, a total of ten firms were capitalized: 
 
Table 4: Capitalized Enterprises 
Source: Unidad de Reordenamiento. 
SOE  Sale Value (US$) 
71.  Empresa Generadora de Electricidad (CORANI)   117.592.600
72.  Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (ENTEL)  1.220.000.476
73. Empresa  Ferroviaria  Andina  26.502.000
74.  Empresa Ferroviaria Oriental   51.706.197
75.  Empresa Generadora de Electricidad (GUARACACHI)   94.262.000
76.  Lloyd Aéreo Boliviano   94.949.999
77.  Empresa Petrolera Andina   529.554.041
78.  Empresa Petrolera Chaco   613.334.002
79.  Transportadora de hidrocarburos (TRANSREDES)   526.999.999
80.  Empresa Generadora de Electricidad (Valle Hermoso)   67.842.200
 
Capitalization was applied to enterprises that operated in non-competitive markets 
(monopolies). For the most part, these SOEs were public service providers and were the 
largest firms in operation in both the public and private sectors. These firms also employed 
the largest number of workers and, consequently, were home to the largest labor unions. All 
of these companies had productivity and efficiency indicators below international 
benchmarks before privatization, according to a study undertaken by the Ministry of 
Capitalization (1994). 
To establish clear rules of the game for the capitalization process, the government 
modified the legal system through the passage of laws in the electricity (1994), 
telecommunications (1995), and hydrocarbons (1996) sectors.
11 In addition, a regulatory 
framework for the sectors in which capitalized enterprises operate was established by 
creating the Sector Regulatory System (Sistema de Regulación Sectorial “SIRESE”), which 
                                                 
11 Within the strategic sectors mentioned, the transportation sector is the only one which does not yet have a 
Law of Transportation. 
  19has five sector specific Superintendencies charged with regulating, controlling, and 





The third wave of privatizations once again adopted the classical approach. This wave 
included the privatization of 14 SOEs, some of which were units of former state 
monopolies. The 14 SOEs privatized during this wave are listed below: 
 
Table 5: Privatized Enterprises (1999-2000) Third Wave 
Source: Unidad de Reordenamiento.
13 
SOEs Sale  Value  ($US) 
81.  Refinería de Petróleo (EBR)  102.000.500 
82.  Planta de almacenaje de carburantes y 
poliductos     
12.054.321 
83.  Estaciones de servicio de aeropuertos  11.100.000 
84. Gasolineras  n.a. 
85.  Empresa Minera Vinto – Antimonio  1.100.000 
86.  Financiera de Desarrollo S.A.  n.a. 
87.  Campo Geotérmico Laguna Colorada  313.100 
88.  Fábrica Nacional de Explosivos Sam  2.663.776 
89.  Fábrica Nacional de Cemento  26.000.000 
90.  Empresa Metalúrgica Vinto – Estaño  14.751.349 
91. Empresa  Minera  Huanuni  501.123 
92.  Planta Industrial Oruro  250.999 
93.  Empresa Minera Colquiri  211.779 
94.  Planta de Productos Lácteos Milka  211.779 
 
3.2 Studies of Bolivian Privatization 
 
Relatively little has been written about the privatization processes in Bolivia, especially in 
regards to the first privatization phase (1992). Many of the existing studies were prepared 
prior to the actual privatization process and thus concentrate on describing the theoretical 
advantages of privatization. More recent studies have focused primarily on the capitalized 
enterprises and tend to be descriptive in nature. 
The most complete study describing Bolivia’s privatization process was prepared by 
the Ministry of Capitalization. A paper by Montero (1994), while not referring to 
privatization per se, provides some insight into the financial performance of some public 
                                                 
12 The Law for the Sector Regulatory System (SIRESE) was enacted in 1994. The SIRESE is a regulatory 
system composed of five sectoral superintendencies (electricity, hydrocarbons, telecommunications, 
transportation and water and sanitary services) and a General Superintendency. 
13 Some records were not available (n.a).  
  20enterprises prior to their privatization. In addition, some attempts were made by the State to 
follow up on firms privatized at the beginning of the 1990s. For example, in 1994 the 
Unidad de Reordenamiento devised a questionnaire to collect data on production, 
employment, investment, tax payments, and other categories from privatized firms. 
Regrettably, the firms did not return the questionnaires with the requested 
information. This scenario changed slightly with the second wave of privatization. Given 
the great differences in both magnitude of assets and number of employees between the 
first and second waves of privatization, capitalization has without a doubt been the process 
most heavily studied, both by local and foreign researchers. The majority of the studies 
written on capitalization are also case studies.
14 More recent work, such as that of Barja and 
Urquiola (2001), analyzed the impact of capitalization and the regulatory system on the 
access to and the availability of these services for low income households. 
One of the principal obstacles preventing more studies of both the first and second 
privatization waves is the lack of information (mainly financial data) about firms before 
and after privatization. Additionally, little follow-up is available, and in many cases these 
businesses were closed after being privatized. With regards to the third privatization wave, 
very little literature exists due to the fact that it is relatively recent. 
Taking this into account, the current study is the first to attempt to revise and gain 
access to information concerning the actual performance of privatized companies from 
1992 to 2000. 
 
3.3 The Effort to Collect Information 
 
The effort to collect information was exhaustive, difficult, and time-consuming. It required 
the collaboration of various public and private institutions. Nine information sources were 
identified and used to collect both primary and secondary data. Among the primary 
information sources were the Reorganization Unit (UR), the Vice Ministry of Budget and 
Accounting (VPC), the National Chamber of Hotels, research documents on Bolivian 
privatizations, the National Statistical Institute (INE), the National Tax Service (SIN), the 
National Service of Commerce Registry (SENAREC), the General Superintendency 
(SIRESE), and business surveys. 
                                                 
14 For a wider study of the businesses which were capitalized, see Peirce (1997). 
  21Pre-privatization information on financial balance sheets and other important data 
sources were collected from government institutions. The National Statistical Institute 
(INE) and the National Tax Service (SIN) provided information for periods when 
companies were still part of the public sector. The INE provided information on 30 percent 
of the companies in the study; the remaining companies did not present accounting ledgers 
to the Institute. 
  The National Service of Commerce Registry (SENAREC) and the General 
Superintendency (SIRESE) supplied information for companies after privatization. 
SENAREC provided information on the actual owners of the businesses along with their 
addresses, while SIRESE provided the annual reports of the capitalized companies. 
 
3.4 Limitations on Availability and Quality of Information 
 
In order to complete the information required for the study, a survey was carried out to 
obtain financial and management information for the companies after they had been 
privatized. 
Information on Bolivia’s privatized SOEs is scarce for several reasons. Because of 
their small size, information on firms’ performance while they were public was not always 
collected and kept. The same is true regarding information on the performance of those 
firms after privatization. Since over 90 percent of them are small- or medium-sized, and in 
contrast to small- or medium-sized SOEs in other countries, their stock is not traded 
publicly. As a result, it was necessary to request information from various sources. 
Furthermore, since data was not kept systematically under one uniform criterion, the nature 
and quality of the data varies. This represents a limitation for the present study and 
demands caution when interpreting the results. 
 
4. The Availability and Nature of the Information on Privatized Firms 
 
4.1 The Privatized Firms Considered in the Study 
 
The Unidad de Reordenamiento (UR), a unit of the Ministry of Investment and 
Privatization, is the government agency responsible for privatization. As such, it maintains 
records of the different privatizations undertaken in Bolivia. According to the UR, from 
  221992 to the present, 93 public enterprises have been transferred to the private sector. Of 
these enterprises, 83 were privatized in the traditional manner and 10 were capitalized.
15 
While the number of privatized firms appears large, the majority of them could not be 
included in our study because they did not satisfy some basic requirements set forth at the 
outset. The criteria applied required that firms: 
•  had to be operating prior to their privatization 
•  were transferred as active enterprises 
•  had to operate a minimum number of years after being privatized 
•  had individual financial statements available before and after the privatization 
•  had accessible information for the periods before and after their transfer to the 
private sector could be obtained 
 
Of the 93 firms, only 31, including one concession, could be included in the study. The 
sample did not take into account several types of SOEs: firms too small and without proper 
records, since the lack of information made it impossible to determine what their current 
status was; firms privatized in the period 1999-2000, because too little time had elapsed for 
the results of privatization to be observable (this is the case for firms privatized in the third 
wave); firms split into various businesses in order to be transferred, hence making it 
difficult to undertake the necessary comparisons; firms sold as divided assets, since they 
did not operate after being privatized; firms that did not have financial statements when 
they were public, since no measure of their performance as public entities could be 
obtained, and firms that declined to provide information relative to their current situation as 
private enterprises, since their performance as private firms could not be measured and 
comparisons could not be made. 
Table 6 summarizes the number of privatized firms that satisfied the conditions for 
the study as well as those that did not. Table 7 provides a breakdown of privatized firms by 
economic sector. Of the 31 firms included in the study, four were transferred to the private 
sector under the capitalization scheme, and 26 were privatized under the traditional scheme. 
The final firm was transferred to the private sector in administration. 
 
                                                 
15 The number of capitalized enterprises can be counted as the number of enterprises prior to capitalization or 
the number of enterprises resulting from the capitalization process. In this study, the last criterion has been 
adopted. 
 
  23Table 6: Firm Breakdown 
Reason Number  Privatization  Period 
No Information Available (*)   4  I 
Privatized in 1999-2000   10  III 
Sold as Assets   9  I 
No Financial Statements Available from Pre-Privatization 
Period   29 I,  II 
Firms Created from Disintegrated Monopolies   11  II, III 
Enterprises Included in Study (**)   30  I, II, III 
Total 93   
(*) This is the case of some small firms for which proper records were not kept. Thus, it has not been 
possible to find their current business stauts, let alone whether they had been sold to the private sector. 
(**) This number does not include one concession included in the study. The firms in the study belong 
to different sectors, such as agro-industrial, electricity, water, manufacturing, telecommunications, 
transportation and hotels. 
 
Table 7: Privatized Firms by Economic Sector 
Sector  Privatized  Included in Study 
Agro-industrial  32  11 
Electricity and Water  5  1 
Hydrocarbons  2  0 
Lodging  15  8 
Industry  12  0 
Manufacturing  10  3 
Services  7  0 
Transport and Communications  10  7 
Total  93  30 
Total + 1 concession  94  31 
   Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
The firms in this study represent more than 50 percent of the sale value of the firms sold in 
the corresponding sectors. This percentage ranges from 100 percent in the agro-industrial 
sector to around 50 percent in the manufacturing, transportation and telecommunication 
sectors to 20 percent in electricity, water and hotels, as shown in Table 8. 
 
  24Table 8: Percentage of Firms Included in the Study (Based on Sales Value) 
Sector  Privatized/Not Analyzed  Privatized/Analyzed 
Agro-industrial  2.5%  97.5% 
Electricity and water  84.0%  16.0% 
Hydrocarbons  100.0%  0.0% 
Lodging  80.7%  19.3% 
Industry  100.0%  0.0% 
Manufacturing  50.7%  49.3% 
Services  100.0%  0.0% 
Transport and Communications  43.4%  56.6% 
Total  72.5%  27.5% 
       Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
5. Empirical Analysis 
 
5.1 Description of the Data 
 
The data employed in this study can be classified in three groups: financial data, 
employment data, and ownership structure. The first group encompasses financial variables 
collected from the financial statements of the SOEs. The variables considered are those that 
quantify income (sales, operating income) and expenses (operating expenses, taxes). They 
also refer to assets, liabilities and equity as well as profit measures such as operating profit, 
net profit and gross profit. These variables were obtained from the firms’ financial 
statements. 
The second group includes labor data and was obtained from different reports 
written before the SOEs were transferred to the private sector. These reports are 
complemented by a survey of the private firms conducted as part of this study. The labor 
data classifies employment in two groups: administrative and operating employees. This 
classification is slightly different from that of white- and blue-collar workers since the first 
group includes employees in management while the second group includes workers and 
support personnel. 
The third group includes variables collected through a survey and places special 
emphasis on whether firms are family-owned as opposed to publicly-held corporations. 
This difference in ownership was considered because it normally leads to differences in 
management characteristics; family-owned firms are not subject to certain requirements and 
thus do not face the discipline imposed by the market. 
  25In addition to the issues regarding quality of information discussed earlier, the data 
set constructed with information collected for the 31 transferred enterprises has other 
limitations. It is not particularly extensive and is slightly unbalanced (the number of 
indicators prior to privatization is not the same as after privatization). Nonetheless, the data 
set constitutes the most extensive and serious effort to compile data on the transfer of SOEs 
to the private sector in Bolivia; therefore, it is very valuable for the analysis of the impact 
of those transfers. Furthermore, it should be noted that the data set is somewhat different 
from those employed in similar studies of other countries in that very small family-owned 
enterprises that don’t trade in the stock market are included. A1 in the Appendix 
summarizes the degree of unbalancedness of the sample.     
Different sources had to be consulted in order to compile the data set. When 
possible, information was cross-checked in order to verify the quality and consistency of 
the information collected. When differences were encountered, data and sources were 
selected that matched trends and similarities, with the aim of maintaining consistency in the 
data set.
16 The majority of the data relative to operating income and operating costs have 
SAFCO as their source; data on assets and liabilities come predominantly from the UR; and 
INE has been an important source for employment data. In many cases, series had to be put 
together from different sources. Only one source was used for the data series on operating 
income, expenses and profits. All the financial data has been deflated by the consumer price 
index (CPI) in order to be expressed in constant 1990 bolivianos. 
 
5.2 Ratio Analysis 
 
This section seeks to measure the change in performance of the privatized firms by 
comparing certain ratios before and after the transfers. The comparison looks at the 
direction as well as at the significance of the change. The methodology employed, which is 
the same as that in La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1997), is based on the analysis of means 
and medians of different financial ratios that reflect profitability, operating efficiency, and 
other measures related to firm performance. The methodology can be described as follows: 
                                                 
16 Many of the differences were due to the application of distinct accounting systems, as many of the balance 
sheets and income statements were not audited. 
  26First, the means and medians before and after privatization for each firm and each ratio 






















M    i = 1.....31 
 
where   is the mean of firm i before privatization (year j) and  is the corresponding mean 
after privatization, n is the number of years considered in which the firm was public and m 






The average ratio before and after privatization was calculated for the 31 firms in 

















It should be stressed that the number of firms T included in the construction of each ratio is 
different but for the cases in which all 31 firms could be included. 
To test the significance of the difference between the average before and the 
average after privatization two types of tests were carried: the parametric t test in the case 
of means and the non-parametric Z test (Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test) for the medians. 
Given that the sample is small, results obtained in the test of medians were considered more 
attentively. 
Table A2 in Appendix 1 details the 26 ratios calculated. These ratios can be divided 
into the following seven groups: 
 
•  Profitability (operating income over sales; operating costs over operating 
income) 
•  Operating efficiency (log of sales over fixed assets; net income over sales) 
•  Labor (log of employees; average salary) 
•  Assets and investment (investment over sales; investment over fixed assets) 
•  Liabilities (total liabilities) 
•  Output (log of sales) 
•  Net taxes (net taxes over sales) 
 
                                                 
17 A similar procedure was followed in the case of medians. 
  27Liabilities were included in order to capture the change in the debt burden of the firms. This 
point is important in the Bolivian case since the great majority of firms were in heavy debt 
or had serious liquidity problems when public. 
The ratio analysis was performed with two different ratios: i) Unadjusted ratios and 
ii) adjusted ratios. While the first is a straight comparison of ratios, the second incorporates 
adjustments to take away any possible influence of the macroeconomic context on firm 
performance. In the analysis, more attention is given to those ratios that include a greater 
number of firms and to those that upon comparison of the ratios before and after 
privatization show a difference that is significant. 
 
5.2.1 Unadjusted Ratios 
 
The unadjusted ratios suggest that there has been an improvement in the profitability and 
operating efficiency of the firms. This improvement, however, is not significant except for 
the case of the ratio of log of sales to fixed assets that, according to the Z test, is significant 
at 10 percent. A significant decrease (at the 10 percent level) can be observed in the number 
of employees as well as in fixed assets. Finally, as could be expected, there was a reduction 
in liabilities, in part due to the fact that the Government assumed some of them in order to 
make the firms more attractive at the time they were sold. 
The t statistics of the parametric test of means, and the Z statistics of the 
nonparametric test of medians (Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test) are reported in Tables A3 and 
A4 in Appendix 1. As mentioned earlier, not having data for all firms meant that the 
comparison of ratios incorporates a different number of observations (see Tables A5 and 




According to the means test, five of the six profitability indicators show an increase. 
However, none of these are significant, not even at the 10 percent level. Similarly, the 
median test shows that the six indicators have improved but without being significant. This 
seems to suggest that the transfer of enterprises to the private sector in Bolivia had no 
significant impact on performance, as measured by profitability. Of course, a more 
  28conclusive evaluation requires controlling for macroeconomic and other external factors 
that could have had an effect on profitability. 
The evaluation of ratio r2 (net profit over sales), the only ratio that could be 
constructed for all the firms, shows an average increase in profitability of 5.3 percentage 
points, according to means, and 5 percentage points in the case of medians. This 
improvement is associated with a decrease in sales without the corresponding decrease in 




Four of the five operating efficiency ratios show an improvement. The only one showing a 
decrease is e4 (operating profit over sales). Unit costs have, on the average, increased by 
8.8 percentage points, while operating profit over sales have decreased by 8.2 percentage 
points. The t test shows that none of the differences in means are significant; however, the 
Z test shows that the improvement in the ratio e2 (log of sales over fixed assets) is 
significant at the 10 percent level. This increase of 26.4 percent could be explained by the 




As with the majority of studies on the impact of privatization, the authors found that the 
transfer of enterprises to the private sector led to a decrease in the level of employment at 
those enterprises. Such decreases are observable among both administrative personnel and 
operating personnel. 
  The authors can not make conclusions about the decrease in administrative and 
operating personnel individually because none of the differences is significant. However, 
the log of total employees, which shows a reduction of 1.43 percent, is significant at the 10 
percent level in the case of median differences. 
With respect to mean salaries, the authors found that at the aggregate level, as in the 
case of administrative and operating personnel, salaries are higher after the transfer of the 
SOEs. This seems to be associated with the reduction in personnel, which was not matched 
with a proportionate reduction in the aggregate payroll. These increases, however, are not 
significant, suggesting the effect on average salaries is not significant. 
  29 
Assets and Investment 
 
The authors looked at two different variables: i) Fixed assets, which refer to assets such as 
machinery, equipment and buildings owned by the firms, and ii) Investment, which refers 
to the flows of capital to the businesses which may be used to acquire fixed assets. 
The data shows that, in general, fixed assets have decreased while investment has 
increased. This results in ratio ai4 (investment over fixed assets) increasing, though by only 
0.3 percent. The difference in this ratio, which includes 17 of the 31 firms, is significant at 
the 10 percent level in the case of the median test. 
The decrease in fixed assets appears to be associated with the excessive production 
capacity of SOEs when public. The increase in investment reflects, in the case of the 
capitalized enterprises, the fact that private investors had committed to invest specific 
amounts at the time of the transfer. 
 
Liabilities and Liquidity 
 
In order to make the enterprises more appealing to investors, the State assumed the debts of 
the SOEs, particularly the larger ones, before transferring them. This is one of the primary 
reasons why liabilities were smaller after the enterprises had been transferred, as evidenced 
by the reduction of the log of liabilities (-6.22 percent), which proves to be significant at the 
5 percent level for the case of medians. 
In addition to the reduction in liabilities, the difference of the liquidity ratio has 





As mentioned earlier, the sales level of the transferred firms dropped after the transfer, 
although this change is not significant. The comparison of means shows a reduction in the 
log of sales of 2.2 percent and 2 percent in the case of medians. It should be pointed out 
that in the case of this indicator information was available for all the firms in the sample.  
  30  A comparison of this ratio with ratio r2 (net profit over sales) suggests that, while 





Finally, the change in the net taxes ratio was considered as a way to evaluate the degree to 
which the transfer of enterprises to the private sector changed the amount of government 
revenues collected via taxes. Taxes paid by transferred enterprises increased from 5.33 
percent to 7.83 percent in the case of means and from 4.7 percent to 6.77 percent in the case 
of medians. These changes, however, were not found to be significant. 
 
5.2.2 Adjusted Ratios 
 
Towards the end of the 1990s, the Bolivian economy experienced severe fluctuations in 
growth rate, from an average of 4.8 percent between 1995-1998 to 0.44 percent in 1999. In 
addition, this period was characterized by increasing openness in Bolivian markets.
18 These 
types of fluctuations can influence the results previously discussed, since it is likely that the 
performance of firms reflect external factors in addition to the effects of transferring the 
enterprises to the private sector. 
  In order to evaluate the analysis of the impact of transferring the SOEs to the private 
sector on sales, efficiency, profitability and employment, it is necessary to isolate those 
effects exclusively associated with the transfers from other macroeconomic or industry-
specific sources. To accomplish this, the described ratios were adjusted by incorporating 
information on the ratios of firms that had been private all along. Since this information 
was not readily available, data collected in the Manufacturing Industry Survey was used as 
a control for industrial firms. This survey contains information by industrial classification 
(CIIU) that allows for a close match between industries and the firms in our sample. In the 
case of firms in the service sector, firm-specific information was utilized. 
The methodology employed to isolate the financial results of firms in the study from 
possible external factors follows. 
                                                 
18 During the 1990s, increased openness brought a greater influx of foreign capital. This capital inflow 
favored economic growth, raised employment levels, and increased mean labor productivity (see Jiménez, 
Pereira and Hernany, 2000).  
  31 
The behavior of two groups during the period 1988-2000 was considered: the first 
(G1) included privatized firms in the study, and the second (G2) consisted of firms in the 
same sectors that had been private all along. 
  The financial ratios (X) were calculated year-by-year for each firm in both groups. 
The ratios of the equivalent firms in the two groups were then compared to find the 
differences by firm and by year. Thus, the adjusted ratio for 1990 was obtained as follows: 
 
Xadj 1990 = Xj1990 – Xi1990 
 
where X represents the different financial ratios (r2, e2, e3, etc), i represents firms in G1, 
and j represents firms in G2. 
Once the adjusted ratio was calculated for each year and for each firm (Xadj), the 
mean and median of these ratios were calculated for the 31 firms in the sample. The mean 
and median were calculated for the period in which the firm was public and for the period 
in which it was private. Finally, both mean and median were tested applying the “t” and “z” 
tests. 
  In general, the results reinforce the conclusions obtained with the unadjusted ratios. 
Privatization has led to an improvement in the operating efficiency of firms that is highly 
significant (at the 1 percent level). Employment has been reduced as firms have reduced 
average employment significantly, and fixed assets have decreased proportionately more 
than sales. It is interesting, however, that the improvement in operating efficiency was not 
accompanied by an increase in profitability. 
The results are presented in Tables A7 and A8 in Appendix 1, and the statistical 




Because the ratio r2 (net profit over sales) was the only one that could be constructed for all 
firms, the authors have concentrated on this ratio. As in the case of the uncontrolled ratios, 
the observed change was not significant. This strengthens the preliminary observation 
suggested by the available data: the transfer of enterprises to the private sector in Bolivia 
had no significant impact on their profitability. 
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Operating Efficiency 
 
In contrast, the results concerning operating efficiency suggest that enterprises transferred 
to the private sector had significant improvements when in private hands. Mean differences 
show that ratio e2 (log of sales over fixed assets) had an improvement significant at the 5 
percent level, while median differences show this improvement to be significant at the 1 
percent level. 
The improvement in operating efficiency, which is over 100 percentage points for 
both means and medians, is explained mainly by a reduction of fixed assets proportionately 
greater than that of sales.  
The non-adjusted ratios already showed the ratio e2 to be significant. The increased 
significance that the adjusted ratios show suggests that the macroeconomic context and 





The adjusted ratios provide stronger evidence of the impact of the transfers on employment. 
Whereas the non-adjusted ratios were found to be significant at the 10 percent level, the 
adjusted ratios, which control for the employment reductions in the overall economy, show 
the reductions in employment to be significant at the 1 percent level in the case of medians 
with an 85.8 percent drop in personnel. 
The increases in average salaries, as in the case of the non-adjusted ratios, are not 
significant, suggesting that the aggregate payroll has decreased roughly in proportion to the 
decreases in personnel. Thus, the authors can not conclude that average salaries were 
affected by the transfer of SOEs to the private sector. 
 
Assets and Investment 
 
The authors could control for external effects only for the case of two ratios, ai1 (log of 
fixed assets) and ai5 (log of fixed assets over total personnel). In both cases the differences 
show decreases that were found to be significant at 1 percent and 5 percent, respectively, in 
the median test. 
  33The difference found in ratio ai1 confirms that the improvement in the operating 
efficiency discussed earlier was associated with a significant reduction in fixed assets (the 
reduction was on the order of  -83 percent) as the comparison of medians shows. After they 
were transferred, businesses, particularly the larger ones, removed machinery, equipment 
and installations that were obsolete or could not be used efficiently. A case in point is the 
railroad companies that stopped operating unprofitable routes and sold equipment and 
offices in various cities. 
The observed change in ratio ai5, together with that of employment and ratio ai1, 
implies that the decrease in fixed assets has been proportionately larger than the reduction 
in personnel. This suggests that the improvement in efficiency owes more to improved 




The reduction of the log of sales reinforces the conclusions discussed earlier regarding the 
improvement in operating efficiency. It was stated earlier that such improvement was 
associated with a reduction in fixed assets that was greater than the reduction in sales. The 
fact that the reduction in sales is significant at the 5 percent level (for the case of medians), 
as opposed to the 1 percent significance for the case of the reduction of fixed assets 
corroborates this statement. 
The drop in sales for the adjusted ratios, 29.9 percent according to the mean 
difference and 26.3 percent according to the medians, reflects the fact that the State 
subsidized the sales of public enterprises. Once in private hands, sales respond to the 




Finally, the ratio of net taxes does not show a significant change from the amount paid 
when the enterprises were public. This would suggest that the transfer of SOEs did not have 
a fiscal impact; however, this conclusion would be unsubstantiated since transfers to and 
from public enterprises by means other than taxes were common, and they are not taken 
into account in this comparison 
 
  346. Regression Analysis 
 
6.1 Panel Data Analysis 
 
In this section, the authors seek to identify the determinants of the improvement in the 
performance of the transferred firms. In particular, the authors seek to establish whether the 
transfer of SOEs to the private sector is a significant element in explaining the observed 
improvements in firm performance under private management. For this purpose, the 
authors pooled the observations in a cross section of the 31 transferred enterprises in our 
sample and performed a panel data analysis. Using panel data has various advantages: 
•  It allows for the control of individual heterogeneity. The 
differences of transferred SOEs are captured by the panel data. 
•  It allows for a greater number of degrees of freedom and for the 
capture of more information from the data, with less variability and 
less colinearity. 
•  It allows for a better identification and measurement of effects that 
are not always detectable in time series or cross-section analysis. 
•  It allows for the construction and testing of the behavior of more 
complicated models than purely time series or cross-section 
analysis. 
•  It allows for the bias in the aggregation of firms to be eliminated, 
since it is based on a micro level analysis. 
The usefulness of this technique depends on the availability of information. Here, 
the authors face some limitations related to those faced when compiling the data set. The 
fact that the sample is not complete, due to the unavailability of information about the 
SOEs and the need to exclude some observations because not all the needed control 
variables could be obtained, leads to an unbalanced panel. The problems in the quality of 
the data, both that of the enterprises in the sample as well as that needed for the controls 
(data on other private firms, sectorial indicators or macroeconomic variables) means that 
the measurement error that obtains is rather large. 
Another limitation of the panel data is the relatively short time span of the time 
series. In the present case, this means that the asymptotical arguments rest on the number of 
firms tending to infinity. The authors think that this is approximately the case since, as 
described earlier, the 31 SOEs included represent a relatively high proportion of the firms 
that satisfy the necessary conditions for the study. The possibility of studying more than 13 
  35years is slim because information is either difficult to find or nonexistent. There is also the 
drawback of probably increasing the unbalancedness of the sample. 
The authors have employed a random effects model specified as follows: 
 
it it it u X y + ′ + = β α      i=1,....,N; t=1,….,T 
it i it u ν µ + =  
where the subscripts t and i denote the time series and cross-section dimensions, 
respectively. 
In the following, the dependent variable y refers to operating efficiency indicator e2 
(log of sales over fixed assets). This indicator showed an improvement that was found to be 
significant in the ratio analysis discussed above. 
Additionally, α is a scalar and X is a vector of explanatory variables, or, more 
specifically, dummies that refer to the privatization and other characteristics of the 
transferred SOEs. The variables considered are: 
•  Privatization (P): The dummy takes the value 0 when the firm was 
State-owned and managed and 1 for the years during which it 
operated as a private firm. 
•  Size (PADJ): The value 0 was assigned to small firms and 1 to 
large firms. 
•  Market (DMERC): The value 0 was assigned to firms that operate 
with a certain degree of competition (most often an oligopolistic 
market structure) and the value 1 was assigned to monopolies. 
•  Origin of capital (DCAP): The dummy takes the value 0 when the 
investors to which the enterprise was transferred were Bolivian 
nationals (national capital) and 1 when they were foreigners 
(foreign capital). 
•  Type of product (DTRAN): The value 0 was assigned when the 
main product is only sold in the local market (non-traded) while 1 
was assigned when it is exported (tradable). 
•  Regulation (DREG): The value 0 was assigned if the firm was not 
subject to regulation and 1 when regulation was in effect. 
Furthermore, µi reflects the random effects and is assumed independently and identically 
distributed. IID(0, σ
2
µ),  νit is also assumed independently and identically distributed. 
Furthermore, µi is assumed to be independent from νit and the Xit are independent of µi and 
νit for all i and t.  
The specification of a Random Effects model is appropriate when the group of firms 
has been selected randomly from a large population. In what follows, the authors apply this 
  36model to draw inferences about the transfer of Bolivian SOEs to the private sector based on 
a sample of N=31 firms out of 89 transferred firms. 
In addition, an FGLS (Feasible Generalized Least Squares) was applied under a 
Random Effects model assuming that the variance-covariance matrix is unknown.
19 The 
FGLS method allows for the correction of some problems present in our data such as 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
 
6.2 Regression Results 
 
Table 9 below presents the results of the Random Effect FGLS estimation for the ratio of 
operating efficiency e2 with the dummies described earlier. 
  
Table 9: Panel Data for SOE Transfers to the Private Sector 
E2 Coef.  Std.  Err. z  P>z  [95%  Conf. Interval] 
             
P 0.927161 0.2622923 3,535 0.000 0.4130775 1.441245
Padj 2.171407 0.1790224 12,129 0.000 1.82053 2.522285
Dmerc -0.5731258 0.8514243 -0.673 0.501 -2.241887 1.095635
Dcap -0.1696036 0.3315252 -0.512 0.609 -0.8193811 0.4801738
Dtran 0.0308018 0.2564567 0.120 0.904 -0.4718441 0.5334478
Dreg 2.039633 0.8975973 2,272 0.023 0.2803745 3.798891
_Cons -3.43154 0.1545113 -22,209 0.000 -3.734376 -3.128703
 
The results presented show that the dummy P, which stands for the transfer of enterprises to 
the private sector, has a relatively high coefficient (0.92) and is significant at the 1 percent 
level. This result suggests that the privatization of the former SOEs (i.e., the transfer under 
the two methods adopted in Bolivia) is significant in explaining the improvement in the 
firms’ operating efficiency. 
The dummies Padj and Dreg are also significant. The first of these, which refers to 
the size of the firms, is significant at the 1 percent level (the greatest significance of all), 
suggesting that the size of the firms is an important variable in explaining the improvement 
in operating efficiency. This result is not surprising; the private investors to whom the 
larger SOEs were transferred made the most significant investments and brought in specific 
know-how in the form of management and management systems.  
                                                 
19 A GLS based on the true components of the variance is a BLUE (Best Linear Estimator) and all the GLS 
estimators are efficient asymptotically when either N or T tends to infinity. 
  37The second dummy, which is significant at the 5 percent level, refers to the presence 
of regulation. This result suggests that regulation is one of the factors that has contributed 
to improved firm performance. 
The constant term has a negative coefficient of –3.43—not surprising since data in 
logarithmic form were employed. If a fixed effect panel had been estimated, this coefficient 
would be reflecting firm-specific characteristics. However, since random effects were used, 
this is not the case, and the coefficient can be viewed as a reference value of the operating 
efficiency of the firms. 
The following table shows some details about the regression: 
 
Table 10: Statistical Information 
Estimated covariances  29  Number of obs  148 
Estimated autocorrelations  0  Number of groups  29 
Estimated coefficients  7  Obs per group  min = 1 
       avg = 6,756757 
       max = 11 
     Wald chi2(6)  496.26 
Log likelihood  -235.4944 Prob > chi2  0.0000 
 
As the Chi2(6) test suggests, the seven explanatory variables as a group are significant. 
A similar exercise as the one described was performed on capitalization. The dependent 
variable was e2 but the dummy P was substituted by a dummy (CAPIT) that distinguishes 
the capitalized firms from the rest.
20 
 
Table 11: Panel Data for Capitalization 
e2 Coef.  Std.  Err.  Z  P>z  [95%  Conf. Interval] 
             
Capit -.6789243 .4015432 -1,691 0.091 -1.465934  .1080859 
Padj 1.90591 .163006  11,692  0.000 1.586424  2.225396 
Dmerc -.5692564 .8480953 -0.671  0.502 -2.231493  1.09298 
Dcap .4096318 .350678  1,168 0.243 -.2776844 1.096948 
Dtran .6407181 .310231  2,065 0.039 .0326765  1.24876 
Dreg 2.439737  .9147363 2,667 0.008 .6468867 4.232587 
_Cons -3.149213 .1303688 -24,156 0.000 -3.404731  -2.893695 
 
In this case, capitalization is not significant in explaining the improvements in operating 
efficiency. This result, however, should be taken with caution since the capitalized firms 
                                                 
20 It is important to note that there is a bias in the results because YPFB and ENDE, firms which have had a 
great impact on capitalization, were not included. 
  38included in the sample do not include some of the key sectors such as electricity and 
hydrocarbons. 
The other dummies that were significant in the first exercise also appear as 
significant and, in the case of capitalization, with the same sign. In this case, however, the 
dummy dtran, which describes whether the firm’s main product is tradable or non-tradable, 
is also significant at the 5 percent level and with a positive sign. This suggests that 
competition for traded goods has forced Bolivian firms to become more competitive at the 
international level, thus improving the operating efficiency of firms. 
  The table below shows some details about the second regression: 
 
Table 12: Statistical Information 
Estimated covariances  29  Number of obs  148 
Estimated autocorrelations  0  Number of groups  29 
Estimated coefficients  7  Obs per group  min = 1 
       avg = 6,756757 
       max = 11 
     Wald chi2(6)  436.45 
Log likelihood  -240.968 Prob > chi2  0.0000 
 
As in the previous case, the Chi2(6) test suggests the seven explanatory variables as a group 
are significant, so the model is correctly specified. 
 
6.3 Cross-Section Analysis 
 
In order to obtain some sense of whether quality of management influences the efficiency 
of private firms, the authors undertook a cross-section analysis incorporating a quality of 
management variable. This variable was not considered in the panel analysis because no 
information is available on the quality of management of the enterprises at the time they 
were public. The cross-section analysis looks at the effect of the variables found to be 
significant in the panel analysis plus two additional variables on the change in operating 
efficiency. The two additional variables are quality of management and the operating 
efficiency ratio at the time the enterprises were public. 
In order to determine whether management, among other variables, explains the 
observed change in operating efficiency performance, an OLS regression for the cross-
section of the 31 firms in the sample was performed. The regression does not include time 
  39effects but controls for the firm’s characteristics. The model specification is described 
below. 
Dependent Variable  
The variable e2 was taken as the dependent variable because it was the only ratio that was 
significantly explained by privatization in the panel regression. The change in the variable 
was obtained as the difference in the averages of the adjusted ratios of a firm before and 
after privatization. Thus, the change in e2 for firm Z, privatized in 1995, was calculated as: 
 
                m                    i 
Adj∆ E2 =     Σ (E2/n)t     -   Σ (E2/n)t        t = 1988,  ..........2000  
                     n =1                 n =1 
 
 
where Adj∆ E2 is the change in the adjusted ratio of the log of sales over fixed assets. 
The summation indices m and i represent the number of periods before and after the 
privatization of the firm, where m is the number of years during which the firm was public 




The regression includes dummy variables and the value of the dependent variable in the 
year of privatization. The dummies were: 
1. Market Power: A dummy introduced to measure the degree of market power. 
This dummy takes the value 1 when firms exercise some degree of market 
power(monopoly or oligopoly) and 0 in other cases.
21 
 
2. Type of Transfer to the Private Sector: This dummy takes the value 1 if a third-
party, in addition to the private investor, participates in ownership (capitalization) 
and 0 otherwise. 
 
3. Regulation: A dummy that takes the value of 1 if the firm is regulated and 0 
otherwise. 
 
                                                 
21 The authors referred to pre-privatization studies carried out by consultants to determine whether or not 
firms had market power. 
  404. Quality of Management: A dummy introduced to measure the quality of 
management that takes a value of 1 when management is considered good and 0 in 
other cases. Quality of management was measured in a survey conducted as part of 
this study. 
 
The results show that the coefficient of the operating efficiency variable prior to 
privatization is not significant in explaining the change in efficiency of the privatized firms. 
Also, as found by La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999), market power does not explain 
the change in efficiency. The coefficient of the regulation variable came out as negative but 
insignificant. 
Table 13: Cross-Section Results 
 




















Number of Observations  31 























* = Significant at 1%;  ** = Significant at 5%; *** = Significant at 10% 
White (1980), error –Corrected standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
 
The quality of management variable incorporated into the cross-section analysis is the only 
variable that proves significant in explaining the changes in operating efficiency. This 
suggests that, more than the change in ownership per se, it is the change in managerial 
practices that tends to be associated with a new management team that leads to gains in 
efficiency. Whether managerial practices can be changed without changing ownership is, of 
course, debatable although not unthinkable. Experience has shown, however, that 
transferring SOEs to the private sector is usually accompanied by changes in managerial 
practices. 
  41  The two methods of privatization undertaken in Bolivia differ in that foreign 
investment is practically nonexistent in classical privatization. During capitalization, 
however, the inflow of foreign capital was significant. Thus, it was interesting to test 
whether the method of privatization had an impact on operating efficiency. The results 
showed that the manner of privatization is irrelevant in explaining the change in efficiency 




The preceding analysis was based on a sample of 31 of the 93 Bolivian firms that have been 
transferred to the private sector since 1992. The transfers were conducted primarily through 
the classical privatization method, or the Bolivian scheme of capitalization. In one case, the 
transfer took place via a concession. Two-thirds of the firms could not be included for 
reasons that did not allow for a comparison of the firms’ performance before and after the 
transfers. The 31 firms in the sample, which are of different sizes and operate in different 
sectors, are relatively small by international standards. In many cases, the firms are not 
corporations with publicly traded stock, as is common in other studies on the impact of 
privatization.  
In order to determine the impact of privatization on firm performance, the authors 
performed two ratio analyses, one with unadjusted and the other with adjusted ratios, and 
two regression analyses, one with panel data and the other with a cross-section analysis. 
The ratio analysis presents some evidence that the privatization of SOEs in Bolivia 
has led to an improvement in the performance of the firms considered in the sample.
22 In 
particular, the authors found that while privatization did not have a significant impact on 
profitability, it increased operating efficiency, reduced employment at the firm level, and 
decreased fixed assets. The results hold when adjusted ratios are considered so as to adjust 
for factors other than the transfer of enterprises, such as macroeconomic factors, that could 
have had some effect on the performance of the variables considered. The results obtained 
were in line with the hypothesis set forth and with the findings of similar studies. 
                                                 
22 Not all the ratios can be obtained for the same number of firms, which prevents them from being crossed, 
but the most important ratios in each group of indicators are available for all firms. This allows for some 
conclusions, albeit no general interpretations, to be derived. 
 
  42The panel data analysis, undertaken to identify the determinants of the improved 
firm performance, suggests that privatization is a significant factor in explaining the 
improvement in operating efficiency of the firms. The size of the firms and the presence of 
regulations were also found to be significant in explaining the improvement in operating 
efficiency. 
The OLS regression for the cross-section suggests that while the method of transfer 
(classical privatization versus capitalization) is not relevant, the quality of management 
proved to be significant in explaining the change in efficiency. 
The present report constitutes the first systematic study of the change in 
performance of Bolivian SOEs transferred to the private sector. In spite of significant 
limitations on the availability of information, the findings that emerge from the study are in 
line with those in the recent literature. 
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  48Appendix 1 
 
A1: Sample Balance 
Núm.   Firms  R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 T1  T2  T3 T4 T5 T6 AI1 AI2 AI3 AI4 AI5 L1 L2 P1 IN1
1                                                        Hotel  Pref  Viscachani 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
2                                                       
                                                       
                                                       
                                                       
                                                       
                                         
                                                       
                                                       
                                                       
                                                       
                                                       
                                                       
                                                       
                                                       
                                                       
                                                       
                                                       
                                                       
                                                       
                                                       
PIL  Tarija 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 Hotel  Terminal  Oruro 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
4 PIL  Chuquisaca 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
5 FABOCE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
6 Terminal  Oruro 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1
7  Fabrica de aceites Villamontes  0  1  0  0  0  0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
8 PIL  SC 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
9 PIL  LP 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
10 Ingenio  azucarero  Bermejo 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
11 Ingenio  azucarero  Guabirá 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
12 Fábrica  de  cemento  El  Puente 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
13 Cerámica  roja  de  Oruro 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
14 Hilanderías  SC 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
15   Fábrica  de  alimentos  balanceados  Mairana 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
16 Terminal  Buses  Sucre 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
17 Hotel  Chulumani 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
18 Hotel  Sorata 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
19 Quesos  San  Javier 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
20 Terminal  buses  Cbba 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
21 Hotel  tarija 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1
  49Núm.   Firms  R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 T1  T2  T3 T4 T5 T6 AI1 AI2 AI3 AI4 AI5 L1 L2 P1 IN1
22                                                        LAB 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
23                                                       
                                                       
                                                       
                                         
                                                     
                                                       
                                                       
                                                       
                                                       
                   
SAMAPA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
24 Hotel  Copacabana 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
25 ELFEC 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
26  Empresa ferroviaria Oriental  1  1  1  1  1  1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
27  Empresa ferroviaria Andina 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
28 ENTEL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
29 PIL  Cbba 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
30 Hotel  Coroico 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
31 Hotel  Urmiri 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
  TOTAL 26 31 19 23 26 19 29 22 23 27 19 24 20 15 16 16 16 23 18 15 17 18 18 19 31 19
Note : 0 refers to missing values 
 
 
  50A2: Ratios Used in the Analysis 
(*) Refers to Operating Income minus Operating Costs 
Indicator Ratios  Symbol 
Operating Income/Sales  ioper / vent  r1 
Net Income/Sales  unet / vent  r2 
Operating Income(*)/PPE  uoper / actfij  r3 
Net Income/PPE  unet / actfij  r4 
Operating Costs/Operating Income      coper / ioper  r5 
Profitability 
Net Income/Equity    unet / patri  r6 
Cost per unit  coper / vent  e1 
Log (Sales/PPE)  log(vent / actfij)  e2 
Log (Sales/Employee)  log(vent / totemp)  e3 
Operating Income(*)/Sales  uoper / vent  e4 
Operating Efficiency 
Operating Income(*)/Employee  uoper / totemp  e5 
Log (Employees)  log(totemp)  t1 
Log (Blue Collar Workers) log(operac)  t2 
Log (White Collar Workers)  log(administ)  t3 
Average Wage per Worker  salprom  t4 
Aver. Wage of a Blue Collar Workers  salopc  t5 
Labor 
Aver. Wage of a White Collar Worker  saladm  t6 
Log (PPE)  log(actfij)  ai1
Investment/Sales inv  /  vent  ai2
Investment/Employees  inv / totemp  ai3
Investment/PPE  inv / actfij  ai4
Assets and Investment 
Log (PPE/Employees)  log(actfij / totemp)  ai5
Current Assets/Current Liabilities  actcor/pascor  l1  Liabilities 
Log(liabilities) log  (pas)  l2 
Output Log(Sales)  log(vent)  p1 
Net Taxes  Net Taxes/Sales  imp / vent  in1
 
 





After t-statistic Significance      Var. Diff 





ioper / vent  r1 1.0957  1.2769  -0.9193 0.3658      16.5%  18.1% 
Net Income/Sales  unet / vent  r2  0.0216  0.0743  -0.6722  0.5041     244.7%  5.3% 
Operating Income(*)/PPE  uoper / actfij  r3  0.2165  0.2910  -0.2724  0.7869     34.4%  7.5% 




Income       coper / ioper  r5  0.7440  0.8304  -1.0361  0.3051     11.6%  8.6% 
Net Income/Equity    unet / patri  r6  -0.0859  -0.0323  -0.4464  0.6580     -62.4%  5.4% 
Operating Efficiency                            
Cost per unit  coper / vent  e1  0.7893  0.8773  -0.7014  0.4875     11.1%  8.8% 
Log (Sales/PPE)  log(vent / actfij)  e2  -0.3671  -1.1472  0.2578     -91.0%  33.4% 
Log (Sales/Employee)  log(vent / totemp) e3  6.2528  6.3375  -0.2638  0.7932     1.4%  8.5% 
Operating Income(*)/Sales  uoper / vent  e4  0.2712  0.1895  0.9331  0.3551     -30.1%  -8.2% 
Operating Income(*)/Employee  uoper / totemp  e5  98.5630  217.1340 -1.0318  0.3143     120.3%  11857.1% 
Labor                            
Log  (Employees)  log(totemp)  t1  4.6533 4.5946 0.1278  0.8989     -1.3% -5.9% 
Log (Blue Collar Workers)  log(operac)  t2  4.1294  4.0979  0.0715  0.9434     -0.8%  -3.2% 
Log (White Collar Workers)  log(administ)  t3  2.0009  1.6258  0.7023  0.4883     -18.7%  -37.5% 
Average Wage per Worker  salprom  t4  73.6919  73.8019  -0.0074  0.9942     0.1%  11.0% 
Ave. Wage/Blue Collar Worker  salopc  t5  63.8294  64.6574  -0.0678  0.9464     1.3%  82.8% 
Ave. Wage/White Collar Worker  saladm  t6 175.5004 234.8963 -1.2450  0.2256      33.8%  5939.6% 
Assets and Investment                            
Log (PPE)  log(actfij)  ai1  11.6693  11.2826  0.5540  0.5824     -3.3%  -38.7% 
Investment/Sales  inv / vent  ai2  0.0570 0.0799 -0.6169  0.5414     40.2%  2.3% 
Investment/Employees  inv / totemp  ai3  46.0224  66.9329  -0.4431  0.6611     45.4%  2091.1% 
Investment/PPE  inv / actfij  ai4  0.0288  0.0509  -1.1015  0.2822     76.8%  2.2% 
Log (PPE/Employees)  log(actfij / totemp) ai5  6.9520  6.6898  0.7142  0.4800     -3.8%  -26.2% 
Liabilities                            
Current Assets/Current Liabilities  actcor / pascor l1  2.9933  10.0558  -1.6289 0.1207      235.9%  706.3% 
Log(liabilities) log(pas) l2  11.6362  10.9528  0.8806  0.3844     -5.9%  -68.3% 
Output                            
Log(Sales) log(vent)  p1  10.5271  10.2957  0.3507  0.7271      -2.2%  -23.1% 
Net Taxes                            
Net Taxes/Sales  imp / vent  in1  0.0533 0.0783 -1.1403  0.2613     47.0%  2.5% 
-0.0330 
*** 10% of significance; ** 5% of significance; * 1% of significance 
  52A4: Change in Performance of the Privatized Firms (Median Test) 




Z-statistic Significance    Perc. 
Var. 
Diff 
Profitability                
Operating Income/Sales  ioper / vent  r1  1.0722  1.2767  -0.1569  0.8753    19.1%  20.4% 
Net Income/Sales  unet / vent  r2  0.0506  0.1005  -0.9210  0.3570    98.8%  5.0% 
Operating Income(*)/PPE  uoper / actfij  r3  0.2208  0.2786  -1.1268  0.2598    26.2%  5.8% 
Net Income/PPE  unet / actfij  r4  -0.0081  0.0399  -0.1521  0.8791    -594.6%  4.8% 
Oper. Costs/Oper. Income       coper / ioper  r5  0.7345  0.7615  -0.0127  0.9899    3.7%  2.7% 
Net Income/Equity    unet / patri  r6  -0.0959  -0.0142  -1.3280  0.1842    -85.2%  8.2% 
Operating  Efficiency               
Cost per unit  coper / vent  e1  0.7683  0.8025  -0.8757  0.3812    4.4%  3.4% 
Log (Sales/PPE)  log(vent / actfij)  e2  -0.3165 -0.0529 -1.6720  0.0945  ***  -83.3%  26.4% 
Log (Sales/Employee)  log(vent / totemp)  e3  6.2511  6.4278  -1.6120  0.1070    2.8%  17.7% 
Operating Income(*)/Sales  uoper / vent  e4  0.2851  0.2112  -0.6006  0.5481    -25.9%  -7.4% 
Operating Income(*)/Empl.  uoper / totemp  e5  104.7716  215.3650  -0.2817  0.7782    105.6%  11059.3% 
Labor               
Log (Employees)  log(totemp)  t1  4.6651  4.5981  -1.9161  0.0553  ***  -1.4%  -6.7% 
Log (Blue Collar Workers)  log(operac)  t2  4.1452  4.1083  -1.2412  0.2145    -0.9%  -3.7% 
Log (White Collar Workers)  log(administ)  t3  1.9694  1.6082  -1.3259  0.1849    -18.3%  -36.1% 
Average Wage per Worker  salprom  t4  73.3476  74.1162  -0.1034  0.9176    1.0%  76.9% 
Av. Wage/Blue Coll. Work.  salopc  t5  64.2905  66.9678  -0.0127  0.8767    4.2%  267.7% 
Av. Wage/White Coll. Work.  saladm  t6  177.5629  205.8801  -1.2410  0.2146    15.9%  2831.7% 
Assets  and  Investment               
Log (PPE)  log(actfij)  ai1  11.6198  11.3150  -1.4295  0.1529     -2.6%  -30.5% 
Investment/Sales  inv / vent  ai2  0.0520  0.0665  -1.6331  0.1024    27.8%  1.4% 
Investment/Employees  inv / totemp  ai3  45.0437  42.2723  -1.5335  0.1252    -6.2%  -277.1% 
inv / actfij  ai4  0.0273  0.0303  -1.7752  0.0759  ***  11.1%  0.3%  Investment/PPE 
Log (PPE/Employees) 
log(actfij / totemp)  ai5  6.9638  6.6889  -1.2847  0.1989    -3.9%  -27.5% 
Liabilities               
Current Assets/Current Liab.  actcor / pascor  l1  2.8127  9.7667  -1.0670  0.2860    247.2%  695.4% 
Log(liabilities) log(pas)  l2  11.6710  10.9445  -2.0121  0.0442  **  -6.2%  -72.6% 
Output               
Log(Sales) log(vent)  p1  10.5547  10.3485  -1.1170  0.2640    -2.0%  -20.6% 
N e t   T a x e s                
Net Taxes/Sales  imp / vent  in1  0.0470  0.0677  -1.6426  0.1005    44.0%  2.1% 
*** 10% of significance; ** 5% of significance; * 1% of significance 
  53A5: Summary of Statistics (Mean Test) 
Ratios  Acronyms     Obs. Mean  Std. Deviation  Std. Error Mean
Profitability                   
Operating Income/Sales  ioper / vent  Before  26  1.0957  0.2392  0.0469 
      After  26  1.2769  0.9758  0.1914 
Net Income/Sales  unet / vent  Before  31  0.0216  0.3187  0.0572 
      After  31  0.0743  0.2992  0.0537 
Operating Income(*)/PPE  uoper / actfij  Before  19  0.2165  0.3268  0.0750 
      After  19  0.2910  1.1473  0.2632 
Net Income/PPE  unet / actfij  Before  23  0.0024  0.4055  0.0845 
      After  23  -0.0004  0.2555  0.0533 
Operating Costs/Operating Income       coper / ioper  Before  26  0.7440  0.2568  0.0504 
      After  26  0.8304  0.3393  0.0665 
Net Income/Equity    unet / patri  Before  19  -0.0859  0.4361  0.1000 
      After  19  -0.0323  0.2885  0.0662 
Operating Efficiency                   
Cost per unit  coper / vent  Before  29  0.7893  0.2517  0.0467 
      After  29  0.8773  0.6269  0.1164 
Log (Sales/PPE)  log(vent / actfij)  Before  22  -0.3671  1.0372  0.2211 
      After  22  -0.0330  0.8890  0.1895 
Log (Sales/Employee)  log(vent / totemp) Before  23  6.2528  1.0124  0.2111 
      After  23  6.3375  1.1594  0.2417 
Operating Income(*)/Sales  uoper / vent  Before  27  0.2712  0.3363  0.0647 
      After  27  0.1895  0.3065  0.0590 
Operating Income(*)/Employee  uoper / totemp  Before  19  98.5630  121.5325  27.8815 
      After  19  217.1340 485.9576  111.4863 
Labor                   
Log (Employees)  log(totemp)  Before  24  4.6533  1.5829  0.3231 
      After  24  4.5946  1.5985  0.3263 
Log (Blue Collar Workers)  log(operac)  Before  20  4.1294  1.3760  0.3077 
      After  20  4.0979  1.4114  0.3156 
Log (White Collar Workers)  log(administ)  Before  15  2.0009  1.5115  0.3903 
      After  15  1.6258  1.4122  0.3646 
Average Wage per Worker  Salprom  Before  16  73.6919  41.0462  10.2616 
      After  16  73.8019  43.2757  10.8189 
Aver. Wage of a Blue Collar Workers  Salopc  Before  16  63.8294  34.2509  8.5627 
      After  16  64.6574  34.7839  8.6960 
Aver. Wage of a White Collar Worker  Saladm  Before  16  175.5004 91.1618  22.7904 
      After  16  234.8963 167.6447  41.9112 
Assets and Investment                   
Log (PPE)  log(actfij)  Before  23  11.6693  2.3271  0.4852 
      After  23  11.2826  2.4067  0.5018 
Investment/Sales  inv / vent Before  18  0.0570  0.0943  0.0222 
      After  18  0.0799  0.1263  0.0298 
Investment/Employees  inv / totemp  Before  15  46.0224  97.0187  25.0501 
      After  15  66.9329  154.8926  39.9931 
Investment/PPE  inv / actfij  Before  17  0.0288  0.0351  0.0085 
      After  17  0.0509  0.0749  0.0182 
Log (PPE/Employees)  log(actfij / totemp) Before  18  6.9520  1.0849  0.2557 
      After  18  6.6898  1.1181  0.2635 
Liabilities                   
Current Assets/Current Liabilities  actcor/pascor Before 18  2.9933  3.1255  0.7367 
      After  18  10.0558  18.1280  4.2728 
Log(liabilities) log(pas)  Before 19  11.6362 2.0995  0.4817 
      After  19  10.9528  2.6527  0.6086 
Output                   
Log(Sales) log(vent)  Before  31  10.5271  2.4458  0.4393 
      After  31  10.2957  2.7415  0.4924 
Net Taxes                   
Net Taxes/Sales  imp / vent Before  20  0.0533  0.0488  0.0109 
      After  20  0.0783  0.0852  0.0190 
 
  54A6: Summary of Statistics (Median Test) 
Ratios  Acronyms     Obs.  Negative Ranks  Positive Ranks  Ties 
Profitability                   
Operating Income/Sales  ioper / vent  Before   26  9  5  12 
      After  26  9  5  12 
Net Income/Sales  unet / vent  Before   31  13  18  0 
      After  31  13  18  0 
Operating Income(*)/PPE  uoper / actfij  Before   19  13  6  0 
      After  19  13  6  0 
Net Income/PPE  unet / actfij  Before   23  12  11  0 
      After  23  12  11  0 
Operating Costs/Operating Income       coper / ioper  Before   26  13  13  0 
      After  26  13  13  0 
Net Income/Equity    unet / patri  Before   19  8  11  0 
      After  19  8  11  0 
Operating Efficiency                   
Cost per unit  coper / vent  Before   29  16  13  0 
      After  29  16  13  0 
Log (Sales/PPE)  log(vent / actfij)  Before   22  9  13  0 
      After  22  9  13  0 
Log (Sales/Employee)  log(vent / totemp)  Before   23  8  15  0 
      After  23  8  15  0 
Operating Income(*)/Sales  uoper / vent  Before   27  16  11  0 
      After  27  16  11  0 
Operating Income(*)/Employee  uoper / totemp  Before   19  10  9  0 
      After  19  10  9  0 
Labor                   
Log (Employees)  log(totemp)  Before   24  16  13  0 
      After  24  16  13  0 
Log (Blue Collar Workers)  log(operac)  Before   20  9  13  0 
      After  20  9  13  0 
Log (White Collar Workers)  log(administ)  Before   15  8  15  0 
      After  15  8  15  0 
Average Wage per Worker  salprom  Before   16  16  11  0 
      After  16  16  11  0 
Aver. Wage of a Blue Collar Workers  salopc  Before   16  10  9  0 
      After  16  10  9  0 
Aver. Wage of a White Collar Worker  saladm  Before   16  0  0  0 
      After  16  0  0  0 
Assets and Investment                   
Log (PPE)  log(actfij)  Before   23  16  13  0 
      After  23  16  13  0 
Investment/Sales  inv / vent  Before   18  9  13  0 
      After  18  9  13  0 
Investment/Employees  inv / totemp  Before   15  8  15  0 
      After  15  8  15  0 
Investment/PPE  inv / actfij  Before   17  16  11  0 
      After  17  16  11  0 
Log (PPE/Employees)  log(actfij / totemp)  Before   18  10  9  0 
      After  18  10  9  0 
Liabilities                   
Current Assets/Current Liabilities  Actcor/pascor  Before   18  16  7  1 
      After  18  16  7  1 
Log(liabilities) log(pas) Before    19  13  5  2 
      After  19  13  5  2 
Output                   
Log(Sales) log(vent)  Before    31  18  13  0 
      After  31  18  13  0 
Net Taxes                   
Net Taxes/Sales  imp / vent Before    20  8  12  0 
      After  20  8  12  0 
 
  55A7: Change in Performance of the Privatized Firms (Adjusted Mean Test) 
Acronym Symbol  Mean  Before Mean  After t-statistic Significance    Perc. Var.  Diff 
                          
unet / vent  r2 -0.0192  -0.0451  0.2910  0.7720      134.5%  -2.6% 
                          
log(vent / actfij)  e2  -2.5680  -1.1384  -2.1740  0.0350  **  -55.7%  143.0% 
log(vent / totemp)  e3  -1.3670  -1.1855  -0.2660  0.7920     -13.3%  18.2% 
                          
log(totemp) t1 0.4226  0.0602  0.9279  0.3583      -85.7%  -36.2% 
salopc t5  21.6713  26.2275  -0.2608  0.7960      21.0%  455.6% 
saladm t6  153.4677  191.6829  -0.8324  0.4118      24.9%  3821.5%
                          
log(actfij) ai1  1.6493  0.2581  1.4830  0.1452      -84.3%  -139.1%
log(actfij / totemp)  ai5  1.5493  0.5639  1.4118  0.1671     -63.6%  -98.5% 
                          
log(vent) p1  -1.6683  -2.1676  0.5400  0.5910      29.9%  -49.9% 
                          
imp / vent  in1  0.0153  0.0214  -0.3230  0.7490     40.0%  0.6% 
*** 10% of significance;** 5% of significance; * 1% of significance 
  56A8: Change in Performance of the Privatized Firms (Adjusted Median Test) 




After Z-statistic Significance    
Perc. 
 Var.  Diff 
Profitability                            
Net Income/Sales  unet / vent  r2  0.0115 0.0167 -0.3331  0.7390     45.1%  0.5% 
Operating Efficiency                            
Log (Sales/PPE)  log(vent / actfij)  e2  -2.5748 -1.1366 -3.6199  0.0003 *  -55.9%  143.8% 
Log (Sales/Employee)  log(vent / totemp)  e3  -1.3708 -1.0948 -1.1558  0.2478     -20.1%  27.6% 
Labor                            
Log (Employees)  log(totemp)  t1  0.4122  0.0585 -2.8857  0.0039  *  -85.8%  -35.4% 
Ave. Wage/Blue Collar 
Workers  salopc t5  22.6367  26.0475  -0.1034 0.9176      15.1%  341.1% 
Ave. Wage/White Collar 
Worker saladm  t6  152.7782 183.6646 -0.9308 0.3520      20.2%  3088.6% 
Assets and Investment                            
Log (PPE)  log(actfij)  ai1  1.6461  0.2811 -4.1364  0.0000  *  -82.9%  -136.5% 
Log (PPE/Employees)  log(actfij / totemp)  ai5 1.5557  0.5756  -2.5477  0.0108  ** -63.0%  -98.0% 
Output                            
Log(Sales) log(vent)  p1  -1.6470  -2.0798 -2.5671  0.0103  **  26.3% -43.3% 
Net Taxes                            
Net Taxes/Sales  imp / vent  in1  0.0222 0.0196 -0.4137  0.6791      -11.6% -0.3% 
*** 10% of significance; ** 5% of significance; * 1% of significance 
  57A9: Summary of Statistics (Adjusted Means) 





Profitability                   
Net Income/Sales  unet / vent  Before  31  -0.0192  18.4850  3.3200 
      After  31  -0.0451  13.8822  2.4933 
Operating Efficiency                   
Log (Sales/PPE)  log(vent / actfij)  Before  22  -2.5680  2.7644  0.5894 
      After  22  -1.1384  2.7290  0.5818 
Log (Sales/Employee)  log(vent / totemp) Before  23  -1.3670  2.5905  0.5402 
      After  23  -1.1855  2.0046  0.4180 
Labor                   
Log (Employees)  log(totemp)  Before  24  0.4226  1.2745  0.2602 
      After  24  0.0602  1.4269  0.2913 
Ave. Wage/Blue Collar Worker  salopc  Before  16  21.6713  60.4576  15.1144 
      After  16  26.2275  35.0550  8.7637 
Aver. Wage/White Collar Worker  saladm  Before  16  153.4677 96.5395  24.1349 
      After  16  191.6829 156.2156  39.0539 
Assets and Investment                   
Log (PPE)  log(actfij)  Before  23  1.6493  3.0319  0.6322 
      After  23  0.2581  3.3240  0.6931 
Log (PPE/Employees)  log(actfij / totemp) Before  18  1.5493  1.9799  0.4667 
      After  18  0.5639  2.2017  0.5189 
Output                   
Log(Sales) log(vent)  Before  31  -1.6683  3.4994  0.6285 
      After  31  -2.1676  3.5203  0.6323 
Net Taxes                   
Net Taxes/Sales  imp / vent  Before  16  0.0153  0.0573  0.0143 
      After  16  0.0214  0.0492  0.0123 
 
  58A10: Summary of Statistics (Adjusted Medians) 




Ranks  Ties 
Profitability                   
Net Income/Sales  unet / vent  Before  31  15  16  0 
      After  31  15  16  0 
Operating Efficiency                   
Log (Sales/PPE)  log(vent / actfij)  Before  22  3  19  0 
      After  22  3  19  0 
Log (Sales/Employee)  log(vent / totemp) Before  23  8  15  0 
      After  23  8  15  0 
Labor                   
Log (Employees)  log(totemp)  Before  24  18  6  0 
      After  24  18  6  0 
Ave. Wage/Blue Collar Worker  salopc  Before  16  8  8  0 
      After  16  8  8  0 
Ave. Wage/White Collar Worker  saladm  Before  16  8  8  0 
      After  16  8  8  0 
Assets and Investment                   
Log (PPE)  log(actfij)  Before  23  22  1  0 
      After  23  22  1  0 
Log (PPE/Employees)  log(actfij / totemp) Before  18  13  5  0 
      After  18  13  5  0 
Output                   
Log(Sales) log(vent)  Before  31  21  10  0 
      After  31  21  10  0 
Net Taxes                   
Net Taxes/Sales  imp / vent  Before  20  8  8  4 
      After  20  8  8  4 
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Appendix 2 
 
Constructing the Quality of Management Variable 
 
The quality of management variable was constructed by determining 32 aspects of 
management generally considered important within the literature (sources such as Harvard 
Business School, McKinsey & Company and Bain & Company were used). These variables 
were placed in one of the following five groups: Planning, Finance, Operations, Human 
Resources and Market. 
Information on the different variables was gathered via a survey of the privatized 
firms. Each firm was assigned a score in each of the 5 groups. Firms’ management was 
considered of high quality when they scored over 70 percent (satisfied 70 percent of the 
required aspects) in all of the five groups. 